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 Introduction by G.W. Evans and S. Honkapohja
The rational expectations hypothesis swept through macroeconomics during
the 1970’s and permanently altered the landscape. It remains the prevailing
paradigm in macroeconomics, and rational expectations is routinely used as the
standard solution concept in both theoretical and applied macroeconomic mod-
elling. The rational expectations hypothesis was initially formulated by John F.
Muth Jr. in the early 1960s. Together with Robert Lucas Jr., Thomas (Tom)
Sargent pioneered the rational expectations revolution in macroeconomics in the
1970s.
Possibly Sargent’s most important work in the early 1970’s focused on the
implications of rational expectations for empirical and econometric research.
His short 1971 paper “A Note on the Accelerationist Controversy” provided
a dramatic illustration of the implications of rational expectations by demon-
strating that the standard econometric test of the natural rate hypothesis was
invalid. This work was followed in short order by key papers that showed how
to conduct valid tests of central macroeconomic relationships under the ratio-
nal expectations hypothesis. Imposing rational expectations led to new forms
of restrictions, called “cross-equation restrictions,” which in turn required the
development of new econometric techniques for the study of macroeconomic
relations and models.
Tom’s contributions were wide ranging. His early econometric work in the
1970s includes studies of the natural rate of unemployment, the neutrality of
real interest rates with respect to money, dynamic labor demand, empirics of
hyperinﬂation, and tests for the neutrality of money in “classical” rational ex-
pectations models. In the 1980s Sargent (with Lars Hansen) developed new
econometric methods for estimating rational expectations models.
In addition to these seminal contributions to rational expectations economet-
rics, Sargent made several key contributions during this period to theoretical
macroeconomics, including the saddle path stability characterization of the ra-
tional expectations equilibrium and the policy ineﬀectiveness proposition (both
developed with Neil Wallace), and the observational equivalence of rational and
non-rational theories of monetary neutrality. In later work Tom continued to
extend the rational expectations equilibrium paradigm into new areas. Two
prominent examples are the implications of the government budget constraint
for inﬂation and “unpleasant monetarist arithmetic” (with Neil Wallace) and
the sources of the European unemployment problem (with Lars Ljungqvist).
Tom’s impact on macroeconomics in the early days of rational expectations
extends well beyond this research. His 1979 textbook Macroeconomic Theory
introduced a generation of graduate students around the world to a new vision of
macroeconomics in which time series analysis is fully integrated into macro the-
ory, and in which macroeconomic equilibrium is viewed as a stochastic process.
Sargent’s contributions have not been conﬁned to the development and ap-
plication of the rational expectations paradigm. As a true scholar he became
interested in the theoretical foundations of rationality. As he describes below,
the initial criticisms of the concept of rational expectations led him in the 1980s
1to join a line of research called “learning theory,” in which the theoretical un-
derpinnings of rational expectations were examined.
Tom became one of the pioneers in this area as well. His 1989 papers with
Albert Marcet showed how to use the tools of stochastic approximation to an-
alyze convergence of least squares learning to rational expectations equilibrium
in a general framework. His 1993 book Bounded Rationality in Macroeconomics
helped to disseminate the learning approach to a broader audience, and was
part of the rapid growth of research on learning in the 1990s. Tom’s 1999 book
The Conquest of American Inﬂation called attention to the possibility of “es-
cape routes,” i.e. occasional large deviations from an equilibrium, and led to a
surge of interest in persistent learning dynamics. Closely related to the research
on learning are issues of robustness and model misspeciﬁcation to which Tom
(with Lars Hansen) has recently made key contributions.
The depth and range of the contributions we have listed is huge, yet this
is not the full extent. Sargent has also done important research in economic
history. His work in the 1980s on episodes of moderate and rapid inﬂations
and the recent research on monetary standards (with Francois Velde) is much
less technical, but the rational expectations viewpoint remains clearly visible in
these works.
Many collaborators, researchers and students have personally experienced
Tom’s remarkable intellectual depth and energy. His thinking is well reﬂected in
this interview, which has a somewhat unusual format. It gets to the key issues
very quickly. Only at the end is there commentary on some of his personal
experiences as a scholar.
Rational Expectations Econometrics
Evans and Honkapohja: How did you ﬁrst get interested in rational
expectations?
Sargent: When I was a graduate student, estimating and interpreting
distributed lags topped the agenda of macroeconomists and other applied econo-
mists. Because distributed lags are high dimensional objects, people like Solow,
Jorgenson, Griliches, Nerlove, and Almon sought economical ways to parameter-
ize those distributions in clever ways, for example, by using ratios of low order
polynomials in a lag operator. As beautiful as they are, where on earth do those
things come from? Cagan and Friedman interpreted their adaptive expectations
geometric distributed lag as measuring people’s expectations. At Carnegie, Mike
Lovell told me to read John Muth’s 1960 JASA paper. It rationalized Fried-
man’s adaptive expectations model for permanent income by reverse engineering
a stochastic process for income for which Cagan’s expectation formula equals
a mathematical expectation of future values conditioned on the inﬁnite history
of past incomes. Muth’s message was that the stochastic process being forecast
should dictate both the distributed lag and the conditioning variables that peo-
ple use to forecast the future. The point about conditioning variables primed
us to see the importance of Granger-Wiener causality for macroeconomics.
2Evans and Honkapohja: When did you ﬁrst use rational expectations
to restrict a distributed lag or a vector autoregression in empirical work?
Sargent: In a 1971 paper on testing the natural unemployment rate
hypothesis. I ﬁgured out the pertinent cross-equation restrictions and showed
that in general they didn’t imply the ‘sum-of-the-weights’ test on distributed
lags that was being used to test the natural rate hypothesis. That was easy
because for that problem I could assume that inﬂation was exogenous and use
a univariate process for inﬂation. My 1973 and 1977 papers on rational ex-
pectations and hyperinﬂation tackled a more diﬃcult problem. Those papers
found the cross-equation restrictions on a VAR for money and prices by reverse
engineering a joint process for which Cagan’s adaptive expectations formula de-
livers optimal forecasts. This was worth doing because Cagan’s model ﬁtt h e
data so well. Imposing rational expectations exposed a lot about the Granger
causality structure between money and prices that prevailed during most of the
hyperinﬂations that Cagan had studied.
Evans and Honkapohja: Econometrically, what was the big deal about
rational expectations?
Sargent: Cross-equation restrictions and the disappearance of any free
parameters associated with expectations.
Evans and Honkapohja: What do you mean ‘disappearance’?
Sargent: In rational expectations models, people’s beliefs are among the
outcomes of our theorizing. They are not inputs.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you think that diﬀerences among people’s
models are important aspects of macroeconomic policy debates?
Sargent: The fact is that you simply cannot talk about those diﬀerences
within the typical rational expectations model. There is a communism of mod-
els. All agents inside the model, the econometrician, and God share the same
model. The powerful and useful empirical implications of rational expectations
— the cross-equation restrictions and the legitimacy of the appeal to a law of
large number in GMM estimation — derive from that communism of models.
Evans and Honkapohja: What role do cross-equation restrictions play
in Lucas’s Critique?
Sargent: They are everything. The positive part of Lucas’s critique
was to urge applied macroeconomists and econometricians to develop ways to
implement those cross equation restrictions. His paper had three examples.
What transcends them is their cross-equation restrictions, and the absence of
free parameters describing expectations. In a nutshell, Lucas’s critique of pre-
rational expectations work was, “you have ignored cross equation restrictions,
and they are all important for policy evaluation.”
Evans and Honkapohja: What do those cross-equation restrictions have
to say about the evidence in favor of coeﬃcient volatility that Bob Lucas talked
about in the ﬁrst part of his ‘Critique’?
3Sargent: Little or nothing. Lucas used evidence of coeﬃcient drift and
add factors to bash the Keynesians, but as I read his paper, at least, he didn’t
claim to oﬀer an explanation for the observed drift. His three examples are each
time-invariant structures. Data from them would not have coeﬃcient drift even
if you ﬁt one of those misspeciﬁed Keynesian models. So the connection of the
ﬁrst part of his paper to the second was weak.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you feel that your work contributed to the
Lucas critique?
Sargent: It depends what you mean by ‘contribute’. Lucas attended a
conference on rational expectations at the University of Minnesota in the spring
of 1973. The day after the conference, I received a call from Pittsburgh. Bob
had lost a manuscript and thought he might have left it at the conference. I
went to the room in Ford Hall at which we had held the conference and found
af o l d e rw i t hy e l l o ws h e e t si ni t .Il o o k e da tt h eﬁrst few pages. It was Bob’s
Critique. I mailed the manuscript back to Bob. So, yes, I contributed to the
Critique.
Evans and Honkapohja: What were the profession’s most important
responses to the Lucas Critique?
Sargent: There were two. The ﬁrst and most optimistic response was
complete rational expectations econometrics. A rational expectations equilib-
rium is a likelihood function. Maximize it.
Evans and Honkapohja: Why optimistic?
Sargent: You have to believe in your model to use the likelihood func-
tion. It provides a coherent way to estimate objects of interest (preferences,
technologies, information sets, measurement processes) within the context of a
trusted model.
Evans and Honkapohja: What was the second response?
Sargent: Various types of calibration. Calibration is less optimistic
about what your theory can accomplish because you’d only use it if you didn’t
fully trust your entire model, meaning that you think your model is partly
misspeciﬁed or incompletely speciﬁed, or if you trusted someone else’s model and
data set more than your own. My recollection is that Bob Lucas and Ed Prescott
were initially very enthusiastic about rational expectations econometrics. After
all, it simply involved imposing on ourselves the same high standards we had
criticized the Keynesians for failing to live up to. But after about ﬁve years of
doing likelihood ratio tests on rational expectations models, I recall Bob Lucas
and Ed Prescott both telling me that those tests were rejecting too many good
models. The idea of calibration is to ignore some of the probabilistic implications
of your model, but to retain others. Some h o w ,c a l i b r a t i o nw a si n t e n d e da sa
balanced response to professing that your model, though not correct, is still
worthy as a vehicle for quantitative policy analysis.
Evans and Honkapohja: Why do you say ‘various types of calibration’?
4Sargent: Diﬀerent people mean and do diﬀerent things by calibration.
Some people mean ‘use an extraneous estimator’. Take estimates from some
previous study and pretend that they are known numbers. An obvious diﬃ-
culty of this procedure is that often those extraneous estimates were prepared
with an econometric speciﬁcation that contradicts your model. Treating those
extraneous parameters as known ignores the clouds of uncertainty around them,
clouds associated with the estimation uncertainty conveyed by the original re-
searcher, and clouds from the ‘speciﬁcation risk’ associated with putting your
faith in the econometric speciﬁcation that another researcher used to prepare
his estimates.
Other people, for example Larry Christiano and Marty Eichenbaum, by cal-
ibration mean GMM estimates using a subset of the moment conditions for the
model and data set at hand. Presumably, they impose only a subset of the
moment conditions because they trust some aspects of their model more than
others. This is a type of robustness argument that has been pushed furthest by
t h o s en o wd o i n gs e m i p a r a m e t r i cG M M .T h e r ea r ew a y st oc a l c u l a t et h es t a n -
dard errors to account for vaguely speciﬁed or distrusted aspects of the model.
By the way, these ways of computing standard errors have a min-max ﬂavor
that reminds one of the robust control theory that Lars Hansen and I are using.
Evans and Honkapohja: We know what question maximum likelihood
estimates answers, and the circumstances under which maximum likelihood esti-
mates, or Bayesian counterparts to them, have good properties. What question
is calibration the answer to?
Sargent: T h eb e s ta n s w e rIk n o wi sc o n t a i n e di nw o r kb yH a n s e na n d
others on GMM. They show the sense in which GMM is the best way to estimate
trusted features of a less than fully trusted model.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you think calibration in macroeconomics
was an advance?
Sargent: In many ways, yes. I view it as a constructive response to Bob’s
remark that ‘your likelihood ratio tests are rejecting too many good models’.
In those days, the rational expectations approach to macroeconomics was still
being challenged by inﬂuential people. There was a danger that skeptics and
opponents would misread those likelihood ratio tests as rejections of an entire
class of models, which of course they were not. (The internal logic of the likeli-
hood function as a complete model should have made that clear, but apparently
it wasn’t at the time!) The unstated case for calibration was that it was a way
to continue the process of acquiring experience in matching rational expecta-
tions models to data by lowering our standards relative to maximum likelihood,
and emphasizing those features of the data that our models could capture. In-
stead of trumpeting their failures in terms of dismal likelihood ratio statistics,
celebrate the features that they could capture and focus attention on the next
unexplained feature that ought to be explained. One can argue that this was a
sensible response to those likelihood ratio tests. It was also a response to the
5scarcity of resources at our disposal. Creating dynamic equilibrium macro the-
ories and building a time series econometrics suitable for estimating them were
both big tasks. It was a sensible opinion that the time had come to specialize
and to use a sequential plan of attack: let’s ﬁrst devote resources to learning
how to create a range of compelling equilibrium models to incorporate interest-
ing mechanisms. We’ll be careful about the estimation in later years when we
have mastered the modelling technology.
Evans and Honkapohja: Aren’t applications of likelihood based meth-
ods in macroeconomics now making something of a comeback?
Sargent: Yes, because, of course, a rational expectations equilibrium is
a likelihood function, so you couldn’t ignore it forever. In the 1980s, there were
occasions when it made sense to say, ‘it is too diﬃcult to maximize the likeli-
hood function, and besides if we do, it will blow our model out of the water.’
In the 2000s, there are fewer occasions when you can get by saying this. First,
c o m p u t e r sh a v eg o t t e nm u c hf a s t e r ,a n dt h eM a r k o vC h a i nM o n t eC a r l oa l g o -
rithm, which can be viewed as a clever random search algorithm for climbing a
likelihood function, or building up a posterior, is now often practical. Further-
more, a number of researchers have constructed rational expectations models
with enough shocks and wedges that they believe it is appropriate to ﬁtt h e
data well with complete likelihood based procedures. Examples are the recent
models of Otrok and Smets and Wouters. By using log-linear approximations,
they can use the same recursive representation of a Gaussian likelihood function
that we were using in the late 1970s and early 80s.
Of course, for some nonlinear equilibrium models, it can be diﬃcult to write
down the likelihood. But there has been a lot of progress here thanks to Tony
Smith, Ron Gallant, and George Tauchen and others, who have ﬁgured out ways
to get estimates as good, or almost as good, as maximum likelihood. I like the
Gallant-Tauchen idea of using moment conditions from the ﬁrst-order conditions
for maximizing the likelihood function of a well ﬁtting auxiliary model whose
likelihood function is easy to write down.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you see any drawbacks to likelihood based
approaches for macro models?
Sargent: Yes. For one thing, without leaving the framework, it seems
diﬃcult to complete a self-contained analysis of sensitivity to key features of a
speciﬁcation.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you think that these likelihood based
methods are going to sweep away GMM based methods that don’t use complete
likelihoods?
Sargent: No. GMM and other calibration strategies will have a big role
to play whenever a researcher distrusts part of his speciﬁcation and so long as
concerns about robustness endure.
Learning
6Evans and Honkapohja: Why did you get interested in non-rational
learning theories in macroeconomics?
Sargent: Initially, to strengthen the case for and extend our understand-
ing of rational expectations. In the 1970s, rational expectations was severely
criticized because, it was claimed, it endowed people with too much knowledge
about the economy. It was fun to be doing rational expectations macro in the
mid 70s because there was lots of skepticism, even hostility, toward rational
expectations. Critics claimed that an equilibrium concept in which everyone
shared ‘God’s model’ was incredible. To help meet that criticism, I enlisted in
Margaret Bray’s and David Kreps’s research program. Their idea was to push
agents’ beliefs away from a rational expectations equilibrium, then endow them
with learning algorithms and histories of data. Let them adapt their behavior
in a way that David Kreps later called ‘anticipated utility’ behavior: here you
optimize, taking your latest estimate of the transition equation as though it were
permanent; update your transition equation; optimize again; update again; and
so on. (This is something like ‘ﬁctitious play’ in game theory. Kreps argues that
while it is ‘irrational’, it can be a smart way to proceed in contexts in which it
is diﬃcult to ﬁgure out what it means to be rational. Kreps’s Schwartz lecture
has some fascinating games that convince you that his anticipated utility view is
attractive.) Margaret Bray, Albert Marcet, Mike Woodford, you two, Xiaohong
Chen and Hal White, and the rest of us wanted to know whether such a system
of adaptive agents would converge to a rational expectations equilibrium. To-
gether, we discovered a broad set of conditions on the environment under which
beliefs converge. Something like a rational expectations equilibrium is the only
possible limit point for a system with adaptive agents. Analogous results prevail
in evolutionary and adaptive theories of games.
Evans and Honkapohja: What do you mean ‘something like’?
Sargent: The limit point depends on how much prompting you give agents
in terms of functional forms and conditioning variables. The early work in the
least squares learning literature initially endowed agents with wrong coeﬃcients,
but with correct functional forms and correct conditioning variables. With
those endowments, the systems typically converged to a rational expectations
equilibrium. Subsequent work by you two, and by Albert Marcet and me,
withheld some pertinent conditioning variables from agents, e.g., by prematurely
truncating pertinent histories. We found convergence to objects that could
be thought of as ‘rational expectations equilibria with people conditioning on
restricted information sets’. Chen and White studied situations in which agents
permanently have wrong functional forms. Their adaptive systems converge to
a kind of equilibrium in which agents’ forecasts are optimal within the class of
information ﬁltrations that can be supported by the functional forms to which
they have restricted agents.
Evans and Honkapohja: How diﬀerent are these equilibria with subtly
misspeciﬁed expectations from rational expectations equilibria?
7Sargent: They are like rational expectations equilibria in many ways.
They are like complete rational expectations equilibria in terms of many of
their operating characteristics. For example, they have their own set of cross-
equation restrictions that should guide policy analysis.
They are ‘self-conﬁrming’ within the class of forecasting functions agents
are allowed. They can also be characterized as having forecasting functions
that are as close as possible to mathematical expectations conditioned on per-
tinent histories that are implied by the model, where proximity is measured
by a Kullback-Leibler measure of model discrepancy (that is, an expected log
likelihood ratio). If they are close enough in this sense, it means that it could
take a very long time for an agent living within one of these equilibria to detect
that his forecasting function could be improved.
However, suboptimal forecasting functions could not be sustained in the
limit if you were to endow agents with suﬃciently ﬂexible functional forms, e.g.,
the sieve estimation strategies like those studied by Xiaohong Chen. Chen and
White have an example in which a system with agents who have the ability to
ﬁt ﬂexible functional forms will converge to a nonlinear rational expectations
equilibrium.
Evans and Honkapohja: Were those who challenged the plausibility of
rational expectations equilibria right or wrong?
Sargent: It depends on how generous you want to be to them. We
know that if you endow agents with correct functional forms and conditioning
variables, even then only some rational expectations equilibria are limit points
of adaptive economies. As you two have developed fully in your book, other
rational expectations equilibria are unstable under the learning dynamics and
are eradicated under least squares learning. Maybe those unstable rational
expectations equilibria were the only ones the critics meant to question, although
this is being generous to them. In my opinion, some of the equilibria that
least squares learning eradicates deserved extermination: for example, the ‘bad’
Laﬀer curve equilibria in models of hyperinﬂations that Albert Marcet and I,
and Stan Fischer and Michael Bruno also, found would not be stable under
various adaptive schemes. That ﬁnding is important for designing ﬁscal policies
to stabilize big inﬂations.
Evans and Honkapohja: Are stability results that dispose of some
rational expectations equilibria, and that retain others, the main useful outcome
of adaptive learning theory?
Sargent: They are among the useful results that learning theory has
contributed. But I think that the stability theorems have contributed something
even more important than equilibrium selection. If you stare at the stability
theorems, you see that learning theory has caused us to reﬁne what we mean
by rational expectations equilibria. In addition to the equilibria with ‘optimal
misspeciﬁed beliefs’ that I mentioned a little while ago, it has introduced a type
of rational expectations equilibrium that enables us to think about disputes
involving diﬀerent models of the economy in ways that we couldn’t before.
8Evans and Honkapohja: What do you mean?
Sargent: Originally, we deﬁned a rational expectations equilibrium in
terms of the ‘communism of models’ that I alluded to earlier. By ‘model’, I mean
a probability distribution over all of the inputs and outcomes of the economic
model at hand. Within such a rational expectations equilibrium, agents can have
diﬀerent information, but they share the same model. Learning theories in both
macroeconomics and game theory have discovered that the natural limit points
of a variety of least-squares learning schemes are what Kreps, Fudenberg, and
Levine call ‘self-conﬁrming equilibria’. In a self-conﬁrming equilibrium, agents
can have diﬀerent models of the economy, but they must agree about events that
occur suﬃciently often within the equilibrium. That restriction leaves agents
free to disagree about oﬀ-equilibrium outcomes. The reason is that a law of large
numbers doesn’t have enough chances to act on such infrequent events. In the
types of competitive settings that we often use in macroeconomics, disagreement
about oﬀ-equilibrium-path outcomes among small private agents don’t matter.
Those private agents need only to predict distributions of outcomes along an
equilibrium path. But the government is a large player. If it has the wrong
model about oﬀ-equilibrium-path outcomes, it can make wrong policy choices,
simply because it is wrong about the counterfactual thought experiments that go
into solving a Ramsey problem, for example. No amount of empirical evidence
drawn from within a self-conﬁrming equilibrium can convince a government
that it is wrong about its model, because its model is correct for all frequently
observed events. To be motivated to change its model, the government must
either experiment or listen to a new theorist. The theorist has to come up
with a model that is observationally equivalent with the government’s model
for the old self conﬁrming equilibrium outcomes, but that improves the analysis
of counterfactuals relative to those outcomes.
Evans and Honkapohja: Are there interesting examples of this kind of
thing occurring in the macroeconomy?
Sargent: You can tell a story that this is what Lucas was up to with
his 1972 JET paper on the natural rate. If you alter Kydland and Prescott’s
1977 version of Lucas’s story a little, you can alter their timing protocol and
reinterpret Kydland and Prescott’s suboptimal time consistent equilibrium as
a self-conﬁrming equilibrium that could be improved with a better government
model of oﬀ equilibrium path outcomes.
Evans and Honkapohja: Wasn’t this part of your story in The Conquest
of American Inﬂation?
Sargent: Yes.
Evans and Honkapohja: So it seems that you can talk about disagree-
ments among models within a rational expectations framework if you extend
the concept of rational expectations to mean ‘self-conﬁrming’.
Sargent: Yes. This is a nice feature of self-conﬁrming equilibrium mod-
els. My reading of disputes about economic policy is that they are not merely
9struggles based on diﬀerent information or diﬀerent interests — which is all they
could possibly reﬂect within a ‘communist’ rational expectations model. Some
disputes over government policy originate in the fact that advocates have diﬀer-
ent models of the way the economy functions, and it can be diﬃcult to criticize
their models on empirical grounds because they ﬁt the data from the prevailing
equilibrium.
Evans and Honkapohja: What else has learning theory contributed?
Sargent: A couple of important things. First, it contains some results
about rates of convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium that can be
informative about how diﬃcult it is to learn an equilibrium. Second, we have
discovered that even when convergence occurs with probability one, sample
paths can exhibit exotic trajectories called ‘escape routes’. These escape routes
exhibit long-lived departures from a self-conﬁrming equilibrium and can visit
objects that qualify as ‘near equilibria’. The escape paths can be characterized
by an elegant control problem and contribute a form of ‘near rational’ dynamics
that can have amazing properties. I ﬁrst encountered these ideas while working
on my Conquest book. In-Koo Cho and Noah Williams have pushed these ideas
further. I suspect that these escape routes will prove to be a useful addition to
our toolkit. For example, they can sustain the kind of drifting parameters that
Lucas brought out in the ﬁrst part of his Critique, but that, until recently, most
of us have usually refrained from interpreting as equilibrium outcomes. A good
example of the type of phenomena that drifting coeﬃcients with escapes from
a self-conﬁrming equilibrium can explain is contained in the recent AER paper
on recurrent hyperinﬂations by Albert Marcet and Juan Pablo Nicolini.
Evans and Honkapohja: With your co-author Tim Cogley, you have
been studying drifting coeﬃcients and volatilities. Did Lucas’s Critique fuel
your work with Cogley?
Sargent: Yes. Sims claims that while there is ample evidence for drifting
volatilities, the evidence for drifting coeﬃcients is weak. And he uses that fact
to argue that U.S. data are consistent with time-invariant government mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy rules throughout the post WWII period. So when bad
macroeconomic outcomes occurred, it was due to bad luck in the form of big
shocks, not bad policy in the form of decision rules that had drifted into becom-
ing too accommodating or too tight. It is true that detecting drifts in the AR
coeﬃcients in a VAR is much more diﬃcult than detecting drifts in innovation
volatilities — this is clearest in continuous time settings that ﬁnance people work
in. (Lars Hansen has taught this to me in the context of our work on robust-
ness.) Thus, Sims and other ‘bad luck, not bad policy’ advocates say that the
drift spotted by Lucas is misinterpreted if it is regarded as indicating drifting
decision rules, e.g., drifting monetary policy rules. The reason is that, by in ef-
fect projecting in wrong directions, it misreads stochastic volatility as reﬂecting
drift in agents’ decision rules. These are obviously very important issues that
can be sorted out only with an econometric framework that countenances both
10drifting coeﬃcients and drifting volatilities. Tim and I are striving to sort these
things out, and so are Chris and Tao Zha and Fabio Canova.
Economic History
Evans and Honkapohja: Your papers on monetary history look very
diﬀerent than your other work. Why are there so few equations and so little
formal econometrics in your writings on economic history? Like your ‘Ends
of Four Big Inﬂations’ and your paper with Velde on features of the French
Revolution? We don’t mean to insult you, but you look more like an ‘old
economic historian’ than a ‘new economic historian’.
Sargent: This is a tough question. I view my eﬀorts in economic history
as pattern recognition, or pattern imposition, exercises. You learn a suite of
macroeconomic models that sharpen your mind by narrowing it. The models
alert you to look for certain items, e.g., ways that monetary and ﬁscal policy are
being coordinated. Then you read some history and economic history and look
at a bunch of error-ridden numbers. Data are often error-ridden and incomplete.
You read contemporaries who say diverse things about what is going on, and
historians who put their own spins on things. From this disorder, you censor
some observations, overweight others. Somehow, you impose order and tell a
story, cast in terms of the objects from your suite of macroeconomic theories.
Hopefully, the story rings true.
Evans and Honkapohja: Do you ﬁnd rational expectations models
useful for understanding history?
Sargent: Yes. A diﬃcult thing about history is that you are tempted
to evaluate historical actors’ decisions with too much hindsight. To understand
things, you somehow have to put yourself in the shoes of the historical actor and
reconstruct the information he had, the theory he was operating under, and the
interests he served. Accomplishing this is an immense task. But our rational
expectations theories and decision theories are good devices for organizing our
analysis. By the way, to my mind, reading history immediately drives you away
from perfect foresight models toward models in which people face non-trivial
forecasting problems under uncertainty.
Evans and Honkapohja: Interesting. But you didn’t answer our ques-
tion about why your historical work is more informal than your other work.
Sargent: I don’t know. Most of the historical problems that I have worked
on have involved episodes that can be regarded as transitions from one rational
expectations equilibrium to another. For example, the ends of hyperinﬂations;
the struggles for new monetary and ﬁscal policies presided over by Poincare and
Thatcher; the directed search for a new monetary and ﬁscal constitution by a
sequence of decision makers during the French revolution; the eight hundred
year co-evolution of theories and policies and technologies for producing coins
in our work with François on small change. I saw contesting theories at play
in all of these episodes. We didn’t see our way clear to being as complete and
11coherent as you have to be in formal work without tossing out much of the
action. Analyzing the kinds of the transitions that we studied in formal terms
would have required a workable model of the social process of using experi-
ence to induce new models, paradigm shifts and revolutions of ideas, the really
hard unsolved problem that underlies Kreps’s anticipated utility program. (You
wouldn’t be inspired to take Muth’s brilliant leap to rational expectations mod-
els by running regressions.) We didn’t know how to make such a model, but
we nevertheless cast our narratives in terms of a process that, with hindsight,
induced new models from failed experiences with old ones.
Robustness and Model Misspeciﬁcation
Evans and Honkapohja: You work with Hansen and others on robust
control theory. How is that work related to your work on rational expectations
and on learning?
Sargent: It is connected to both, and to calibration as well. The idea
is to give a decision maker doubts about his model and ask him to make good
decisions when he fears that some other model might actually generate the data.
Evans and Honkapohja: Why is that a good idea?
Sargent: One loose motivation for both rational expectations theory
and learning theories is that the economist’s model should have the property
that the econometrician cannot do better than the agents inside the model.
This criterion was used in the old days to criticize the practice of attributing
to agents adaptive and other naive expectations schemes. So rational expecta-
tions theorists endowed agents with the ability to form conditional expectations,
i.e., take averages with respect to inﬁnite data samples drawn from within the
equilibrium. The idea of learning theory was to take this ‘take averages’ idea
seriously by giving agents data from outside the equilibrium, then to roll up
your sleeves and study whether and at what rate agents who take averages from
ﬁnite outside-equilibrium data sets can eventually learn what they needed to
know in a population rational expectations equilibrium. It turned out that they
could. The spirit was to ‘make the agents like econometricians’.
Of course, the typical rational expectations model reverses the situation: the
agent knows more than the econometrician. The agent inside the model knows
the parameters of the true model while the econometrician does not and must
estimate them. Further, thorough rational expectations econometricians often
come away from their analyses with a battery of speciﬁcation tests that have
brutalized their models. (Recall my earlier reference to Bob’s and Ed’s early
1980s comments to me that ’your likelihood ratio tests are rejecting too many
good models.’)
Using robust control theory is a way to let our agents share the experiences
of econometricians. The idea is to make the agent acknowledge and cope with
model misspeciﬁcation.
Evans and Honkapohja: Is this just to make sure that agents are put
on the same footing as us in our role as econometricians?
12Sargent: Yes. And an agent’s response to fear of model misspeciﬁcation
contributes behavioral responses that have interesting quantitative implications.
For example, fear of model misspeciﬁcation contributes components of indirect
utility functions that in some types of data can look like heightened risk aversion,
but that are actually responses to very diﬀerent types of hypothetical mental
experiments than are Pratt measures of risk aversion. For this reason, fear
of model misspeciﬁcation is a tool for understanding a variety of asset price
spreads. Looked at from another viewpoint, models of robust decision making
contribute a disciplined theory of what appears to be an endogenous preference
shock.
Another reason is that decision making in the face of fear of model misspec-
iﬁcation can be a useful normative tool for solving Ramsey problems. That is
why people at central banks are interested in the topic. They distrust their
models.
Evans and Honkapohja: What are some of the connections to learning
theory?
Sargent: There are extensive mathematical connections through the
theory of large deviations. Hansen and I exploit these. Some misspeciﬁcations
are easy to learn about, others are diﬃcult to learn about. By ‘diﬃcult’ I mean
‘learn at a slow rate’. Large deviation theory tells us which misspeciﬁcations
can be learned about quickly and which can’t. Hansen and I restricted the
amount of misspeciﬁcation that our agent wants to guard against by requiring
that it be a misspeciﬁcation that is hard to distinguish from his approximating
model. This is how we use learning theory to make precise what we mean by the
phrase ‘the decision maker thinks his model is a good approximation’. There
is a race between a discount factor and a learning rate. With discounting, it
makes sense to try to be robust against plausible alternatives that are diﬃcult
to learn about.
Evans and Honkapohja: Can this model of decision making be recast
in Bayesian terms?
Sargent: It depends on your perspective. We have shown that ex post,
it can, in the sense that you can come up with a prior, a distorted model, that
rationalizes the decision maker’s choices. But ex ante you can’t — the set of
misspeciﬁcations that the agent fears is too big and he will not or cannot tell
y o uap r i o ro v e rt h a ts e t .
By the way, Lars and I have constructed equilibria with heterogeneous agents
in which the ex post Bayesian analysis implies that agents with diﬀerent inter-
ests will have diﬀerent ‘twisted models’. From the point of view of a rational
expectations econometrician, these agents look as if they have diﬀerent beliefs.
This is a disciplined way of modelling belief heterogeneity.
Evans and Honkapohja: Is this a type of behavioral economics or
bounded rationality?
Sargent: Any decision theory is a type of behavioral economics. It is not
a type of bounded rationality. The decision maker is actually smarter than a
13rational expectations agent because his fear of model misspeciﬁcation is out in
the open.
Evans and Honkapohja: Parts of your description of robustness remind
us of calibration? Are there connections?
Sargent: I believe there are, but they are yet to be fully exploited. Robust
versions of dynamic estimation problems have been formulated. In these prob-
lems, the decision maker does not use standard maximum likelihood estimators
for his approximating model — he distrusts his likelihood function. Therefore,
he distorts his likelihood function in preparing his estimates. This twisting is
reminiscent of what some calibrators do, though the robustness procedure is
more precisely deﬁned, in the sense that you can answer your earlier question
about ‘what question is calibration the answer to?’
Evans and Honkapohja: Why has Sims criticized your work on robust-
ness?
Sargent: He thinks it is not wise to leave the Bayesian one-model frame-
work of Savage. He thinks that there are big dividends in terms of ease of
analysis by working hard to represent fear of model misspeciﬁcations in ways
that stay within the Bayesian framework.
However, I should say that Lars’s and my readings of Chris’s early work
on approximation of distributed lags were important inspirations for our work
on robustness. Chris authored a beautiful approximation error formula and
showed how to use it to guide the choice of appropriate data ﬁlters that would
minimize approximation errors. That beautiful practical analysis of Chris’s
had a min-max ﬂavor and was not self-consciously Bayesian. One version of
Chris’s min-max analysis originated in a message that Chris wrote to me about
a comment in which I had argued that a rational expectations econometrician
should never use seasonally adjusted data. My argument was very Bayesian
in spirit, because I assumed that the econometrician had the correct model.
C h r i sb o t hr e a dm yc o m m e n ta n dw r o t eh i sm e m oo naM i n n e a p o l i sb u sg o i n g
home from the U in 1976 — that’s how fast Chris is. Chris’s bus-memo on
seasonality and approximation error was pretty well known in the macro time
series community at Minnesota in the late 1970s. (At the time, I don’t know
why, I felt that the fact that Chris could write such an insightful memo while
riding on his twenty minute bus ride home put me in my proper place.) By
t h ew a y ,i nE r i cG h y s e l s ’ s1 9 9 3Journal of Econometrics special volume on
seasonality, Lars and I wrote a paper that went a long way towards accepting
Sims’s bus memo argument. That Ghysels volume paper was one motivation
for our robustness research agenda.
Minnesota economics
Evans and Honkapohja: Along with Carnegie-Mellon and Chicago,
Minnesota during the 1970s was at the forefront in developing and propagat-
ing a new dynamic macroeconomics. What ingredients formed the Minnesota
environment?
14Sargent: Tension and tolerance. We took strong positions and had im-
mense disagreements. But the rules of engagement were civil and we always
built each other up to our students. Minnesota in those days had a remarkable
faculty. (It still does!) The mature department leaders Leo Hurwicz and John
Chipman set the tone: they advocated taking your time to learn carefully and
they encouraged students to learn math. Chris Sims and Neil Wallace were my
two best colleagues. Both were forever generous with ideas, always extremely
critical, but never destructive. The three of us had strong disagreements but
there was also immense respect. Our seminars were exciting. I interacted in-
tensively with both Neil and Chris through dissertations committees.
The best thing about Minnesota from the mid 70s to mid 80s was our ex-
traordinary students. These were mostly people who weren’t admitted into
top 5 schools. Students taking my macro and time series classes included
J o h nG e w e k e ,G a r yS k o o g ,S a l i hN e f t c i ,G e o r g eT a u c h e n ,M i c h a e lS a l e m i ,L a r s
Hansen, Rao Aiyagari, Danny Peled, Ben Bental, Bruce Smith, Michael Stutzer,
Charles Whiteman, Robert Litterman, Zvi Eckstein, Marty Eichenbaum, Yochanan
Shachmurove, Rusdu Saracoglu, Larry Christiano, Randall Wright, Richard
Rogerson, Gary Hansen, Selahattin Imrohoroglu, Ayse Imrohoroglu, Fabio Canova,
Beth Ingram, Bong Soo Lee, Albert Marcet, Rodolfo Manuelli, Hugo Hopen-
hayn, Lars Ljungqvist, Rosa Matzkin, Victor Rios Rull, Gerhard Glomm, Ann
Vilamil, Stacey Schreft, Andreas Hornstein, and a number of others. What a
group! A who’s-who of modern macro and macroeconometrics. Even a gover-
nor of a central bank (Rusdu Saracoglu)! If these weren’t enough, after I vis-
ited Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1981-82, Patrick Kehoe, Danny Quah, Paul
Richardson, and Richard Clarida each came to Minneapolis for much of the
summer of 1982, and Danny and Pat stayed longer as RAs. It was a thrill
teaching classes to such students. Often I knew less than the students I was
‘teaching’. Our philosophy at Minnesota was that we teachers were just more
experienced students.
One of the best things I did at Minnesota was to campaign for us to make
an oﬀer to Ed Prescott. He came in the early 1980s and made Minnesota even
better.
Evans and Honkapohja: You make 1970s-1980s Minnesota sound like
a love-in among Sims and Wallace and you. How do you square that attitude
with the dismal view of your work expressed in Neil Wallace’s JME review of
your Princeton book on the history of small change with François Velde? Do
friends write about each other that way?
Sargent: Friends do talk to each other that way. Neil thinks that cash-
in-advance models are useless and gets ill every time he sees a cash-in-advance
constraint. For Neil, what could be worse than a model with a cash-in-advance
constraint? A model with two cash-in-advance constraints. But that is what
Velde and I have! The occasionally positive multiplier on that second cash-in-
advance constraint is Velde and my tool for understanding recurrent shortages
of small change and upward drifting prices of large denomination coins in terms
of small denomination ones.
15When I think of Neil, one word comes to mind: integrity. Neil’s evaluation
of my book with Velde was no worse than his evaluation of the papers that he
and I wrote together. Except for our paper on commodity money, not our best
in my opinion, Neil asked me to remove his name from every paper that he and
I wrote together.
Evans and Honkapohja: Was he being generous?
Sargent: I don’t think so. He thought the papers should not be published.
After he read the introduction to one of our JPE papers, Bob Lucas told me
that no referee could possibly say anything more derogatory about our paper
than what we had written about it ourselves. Neil wrote those critical words.
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